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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge  
 
 Petitioner Daniel Ramos-Olivieri, a native and citizen of 
Uruguay, entered the United States in February 2001 as a 
nonimmigrant visitor with authorization to stay for six months.  
He overstayed his visa.  On April 6, 2004, the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a warrant for his arrest and 
took him into custody.  Ramos was personally served with a 
Notice to Appear (“NTA”), charging that he was removable 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) as an alien who remained 
in the United States for a time longer than permitted.  The date 
and time of the removal hearing were to be set.  The NTA 




according to the NTA, Ramos was orally notified in Spanish of 
the charges against him and the consequences of failing to 
appear for his removal hearing.  The NTA stated in English that 
an alien is required to immediately inform the Immigration 
Court of a change in address.   
 
 Ramos was released from custody on his own 
recognizance.  As a condition of that release, Ramos was not to 
change his place of residence without first securing written 
permission from his immigration officer.  Ramos’s signature 
appears on the Order of Release following his acknowledgment 
that he understood his conditions of release.   
 
 Six months later, in October, 2004, Ramos moved from 
his North Bergen apartment without notifying immigration 
authorities of his change of address.  The  Immigration Court 
sent him a Notice of Hearing by regular mail to the North 
Bergen address on or about December 4, 2004, for a hearing to 
take place on January 5, 2005.  The hearing took place in 
Ramos’s absence and he was ordered removed in absentia to 
Uruguay. 
 
 In March 2007, Ramos married a naturalized United 
States citizen, Susana Pineyro.  When the couple consulted an 
immigration attorney to begin the paperwork to adjust his status, 
Ramos learned of the Order of Removal.  In April 2007, he filed 
a motion to reopen removal proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2).  He emphasized that he was requesting 
reopening because, had he known about the hearing, he would 
have appeared.  He stated that he was at his North Bergen 
apartment for six months and waited a reasonable amount of 
time before he moved; however, he never received notice of the 
hearing.   
 
 The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied the motion to 
reopen.  The IJ reasoned that the NTA had been personally 
served on Ramos, and once an alien has been served with a 
NTA, it is incumbent upon the alien to make U.S. Citizenship & 




Furthermore, when Ramos was released from immigration 
custody in April 2004, it was on the condition that he not change 
his place of residence without first securing written permission 
from immigration authorities.  The IJ concluded that, because 
Ramos admitted that he moved prior to the mailing of his 
hearing notice, and the record was devoid of any evidence that 
he complied with his obligation to notify the Immigration Court 
of a change in address, no notice of his hearing was required.  
Thus, reopening was unwarranted.   
 
 Ramos appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“Board”), contending that he did not actually receive notice of 
his removal hearing because he moved before it was mailed to 
him, and he was not informed in Spanish that he was obligated 
to inform the Immigration Court of any change of address.  The 
Board dismissed his appeal.  It reasoned that the NTA, which 
explains the consequences of failing to appear, was read to 
Ramos in Spanish, the hearing notice was sent to the address he 
provided, and an immigration officer had certified that Ramos 
was notified that he was required to inform the Immigration 
Court of any change of address.  It also faulted Ramos for 
making no effort over a three-year period to learn the status of 
his immigration proceedings.  It held that the law does not 
require written notice if an alien has failed to provide the address 
required under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F).  See also 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(b)(5)(B) (“No written notice shall be required under 
subparagraph (A) if the alien has failed to provide the address 
required under [8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)].”); In re Villalba, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. 842, 845 (BIA 1997) (language contained in Order to 
Show Cause and Notice of Hearing, which provided that notice 
of deportation hearings will be sent only to alien’s last known 
address, and failure to provide an address may result in an in 
absentia hearing, is reasonable construction of notice 
requirement).  Albeit recognizing that Ramos was now married 
to a United States citizen, the Board concluded that Ramos was 
statutorily ineligible to adjust his status because he failed to 
appear for his removal hearing, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7).  It 
concluded, as well, that even if the record supported his claim 




Ramos’s motion to reopen was untimely.   
 
 Ramos petitioned for review, and the DHS filed an 
unopposed motion to remand so that the Board could determine 
whether its decision should be reconsidered in light of Santana 
Gonzalez v. Attorney General, 506 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2007).  We 
granted the motion.   
 
 On remand, the Board again dismissed the appeal, 
concluding that Santana Gonzalez was inapplicable and thus 
reconsideration was unwarranted.  The Board repeated much of 
what it had said before, emphasizing that Ramos was personally 
served with the NTA, which was read to him in Spanish and 
included notification of the requirement that he inform the 
Immigration Court of any change of address.  Moreover, Ramos 
was informed of this requirement when he was released from 
custody, and the record was devoid of any evidence that he 
informed the Immigration Court or any immigration officer that 
he had moved.  The Board distinguished Santana Gonzalez by 
noting that, although the alien there was no longer at the address 
she had provided, a responsible person was available at the 
address to forward her mail.  Because Ramos did not provide 
notice of a change of address, the Board again concluded that 
notice was not required under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B).  
 
 Ramos timely petitioned for review.  We have 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), (b)(1).  “We review the 
denial of a motion to reopen a removal order entered in absentia 
for abuse of discretion.”  Cabrera-Perez v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 
109, 115 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 
323-24 (1992)).  “Under the abuse of discretion standard, the 
Board’s decision is reversible only if it is ‘arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to law.’”  Barker v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 313, 316 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (quoting Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 
1994)).   
 
 An alien must be provided written notice of his or her 
removal proceedings.  8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).  The notice must 




place at which the proceedings will be held.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229 
(a)(1)(G)(i).  Written notice must be given to the alien in person, 
or, “if personal service is not practicable, through service by 
mail.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1), (2)(A).  Written notice by the 
Attorney General is sufficient if “provided at the most recent 
address provided” by the alien.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A).     
 
 Although written notice is sufficient if mailed to the most 
recent address provided by the alien, the statute also provides 
that an in absentia removal order may be rescinded, upon a 
motion to reopen filed at any time, where the alien demonstrates 
that he did not “receive” notice of the hearing.  8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).  In Santana Gonzalez, we considered two 
questions: “(1) what presumption of receipt attaches to a notice 
of hearing sent by regular mail; and (2) how an alien claiming 
non-receipt of a notice sent by regular mail can rebut that 
presumption, thereby entitling her to an evidentiary hearing on 
that claim.”  506 F.3d at 274-75.  Santana Gonzalez holds that 
the fact that notice was sent by regular mail to the last address 
provided by the alien does not necessarily establish that the alien 
has received the notice under § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).  The word 
“receive” indicates that the focus of the rescission inquiry, in 
contrast to the focus of the initial entry of the in absentia order, 
is on the actual receipt of the required notice and not whether the 
notice was properly mailed.  Santana Gonzalez, 506 F.3d at 277.   
 
 In Santana Gonzalez, we adopted a standard providing 
that a strong presumption of receipt applies only when a notice 
from an Immigration Court is sent by certified mail; a weaker 
presumption of receipt applies when the notice is sent by regular 
mail.  Id. at 279.  An alien’s affidavit claiming non-receipt of a 
notice sent by regular mail, along with corroborating 
circumstantial evidence, may be sufficient to raise a factual issue 
requiring an evidentiary hearing before the IJ.  See id. at 280.  
But this surely does not mean that the failure to receive notice of 
a removal hearing entitles an alien to rescission if that failure is 
the result of the alien’s neglect of his or her obligation to keep 
the Immigration Court informed of a current address.  This is 




Santana Gonzalez does not hold that an alien is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing when the alien both fails to arrange for a 
responsible person who still resides at the alien’s former address 
to forward all mail he or she receives and the alien fails to notify 
immigration authorities of a change in address.  Indeed, we did 
not order the IJ to rescind the in absentia order in Santana 
Gonzalez, and we noted that “it is significant that petitioner 
failed to follow the clear requirement that she give written notice 
of any change in her address, a fact that needs to be considered 
by the IJ in making the ultimate decision.  Id. at 281; see also 
Gomez-Palacios v. Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 360 (5th Cir. 2009) (in 
absentia removal order would not be revoked where alien failed 
to keep Immigration Court informed of his current mailing 
address); Popa v. Holder, 571 F.3d 890, 898 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(same).   
 
 It is important to note, though, that in Santana Gonzalez, 
the record disclosed that a responsible person, the alien’s uncle, 
remained at her former address to forward her mail.  506 F.3d at 
279.  Unlike that alien, Ramos made no arrangements with a 
responsible person to forward his mail nor did he provide the 
postal service with a forwarding address.  In addition, the alien 
in Santana Gonzalez endeavored to contact immigration 
authorities to provide updated mailing information.  Ramos 
made no such affirmative efforts, despite being notified of his 
obligation to do so in both the NTA and as a condition of his 
release from custody.1
 Furthermore, the alien in Santana Gonzalez at all times 
sought a hearing to adjust her status, a form of relief to which 
she was entitled under the Cuban Adjustment Act, and, 
consequently, she “had little to gain by failing to appear at the 
hearing.”  506 F.3d at 280-81.  We concluded that this 
corroborating circumstantial evidence, together with her 
assertion of non-receipt, might be sufficient to rebut the less 
   
 
                                                 
1  Sembiring v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2007), on 
which Ramos also relies, involved an alien whose address did 




stringent presumption of receipt.  Id. at 281.  Here, however, 
Ramos does not even assert that he was eligible for any form of 
relief from removal (except voluntary departure) prior to his 
marriage to Pineyro in March, 2007.  He thus would have had an 
incentive to avoid his removal hearing.  Accordingly, an 
evidentiary hearing was not called for and the Board acted 
within its discretion in denying his motion to reopen. 
 
 Finally, although an alien may seek reopening in order to 
apply for adjustment of status, the Board properly concluded 
that Ramos is statutorily ineligible for such relief for a period of 
10 years pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7).   
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review.  
 
 
